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THE DEFENSE OF NECESSITY IN TEXAS:
LEGISLATIVE INVENTION COME OF AGE
I. Thomas Sullivan*
The law occasionally provides the criminal defendant with an op-
portunity to offer his jury a legal defense to an act admittedly done. Such
a defense is usually the product of a consensus on the part of the com-
munity that the defendant's act may be justified on a specific moral or
ethical ground. Thus, the defendant who commits homicide in defense of
life or family may plead self-defense claiming, in effect, that the homicide
was justified by the circumstances.'
In some instances, when confronted Nvith a defense of conscience or
justification that is not specifically authorized by the lav of the jurisdiction,
the defense attorney may seek to provide for the jury some basis for nul-
lification of the prosecution.2 Thus, in a prosecution implicit wvith political
overtones, for example, draft evasion, the defense attorney may attempt
to interpose the client's personal sense of political ethical conscience in
seeking to explain and justify his violation of the law.3
Legislatures generally do not favor nullification,4 and the Texas Penal
Code (Penal Code) contains no procedural provision relating to a specific
substantive right to present a nullification defense.' The provisions incor-
porated in the Penal Code relating to justification defenses include a range
of acts which are justified in specific situations, including use of force or
other acts in the protection of persons6 and property,7 exercise of force in
furtherance of law enforcement,' and actions particularly relating to special
* B.A., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., Southern Methodist University; mem-
ber of the Texas Bar.
1. TEX. PENAL CODE ANx. §§ 9.31-.33 (Vernon 1974).
2. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See gen-
erally Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to
Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. Cmr. L. & CRMINOLOY 289, 297, 299-301 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Arnolds & Garland].
3. E.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972).
4. Cf. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CA.. L. Rv. 168,
201-07 (survey of state constitutions). Refer to notes 29 & 68 infra and accompanying
text.
5. Provisions of the Penal Code which relate to justification of acts are found
at Tror. Pssx.L CODE AxNNt. ch. 9 (Vernon 1974). Note, however, that the Texas Consti-
tution provides that the jury is charged with determining the law and the facts in
a libel case. Construing that provision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
it was not error to instruct the jury as to the law in a libel case. McArthur v. State,
41 Tex. Crim. 635, 639, 57 S.W. 847, 849 (1900).
6. Tmr.PxAlr CODEAx., §§ 9.31-.34 (Vernon 1974).7. Id. §§ 9.41-A43.
8. Id. §§ 9.51-.52.
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relationships9 including parent-child,'0 educator-student," and guardian-
incompetent. 12 Two general defenses involving justification are also in-
cluded in the Penal Code: public duty and necessity. Public duty relates
to extra-law enforcement means employed by a citizen to enforce the law
or orders of a court."3 Necessity refers to conduct in violation of the law
necessitated by the need to prevent a greater harm or injury.14
The underlying rationale of the defense of necessity is simple: in
some situations an individual may face a threat of harm or injury which is
imminent, and the only alternative to suffering that harm or injury is to
violate a criminal statute. The individual's conduct may, therefore, prove
justifiable when the harm faced by the actor is balanced against the harm
that results from the actor's violation of the criminal statute. The defense
provides a philosophical ground on which to base a defendant's argument
for nullification, a ruling by the trier of fact in opposition to the law
charged in the prosecution. 1" The defense would, therefore, prove desirable
to a defendant whose defense lies solely on his reasoned response to an
imminent threat of harm or injury.
I. His'rocBAL PEESPIECrVE
Anglo-American jurisprudence has long recognized the defense of
necessity, although the infrequency of its successful use is not likely to be
encouraging to contemporary criminal defendants and defense practi-
tioners. 16 Wharton, for example, cites a number of cases in which the
defense was asserted successfUlly.' 7 A California cotrt in a recent prison
escape case used as authority an eighteenth century English decision and
sustained the proposition that a prisoner may, in certain extreme cases,
justifiably escape from custody lawfully."8 The English case had involved
a prisoner who fled a burning prison to save his life.
The classic situation in which the necessity defense was asserted and
9. Id. §§ 9.61-.63.
10. Id. § 9.61.
11. Id. § 9.62.
12. Id. § 9.63.
13. Id. § 9.21.
14. Id. § 9.22.
15. See generally Arnolds & Garland, supra note 2.
16. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIMINAl. LAw 416 (2d ed. 1960).
17. See cases cited in WHARTON'S CiaiNAL LAw § 88 nn.51-58 (Torcla ed.
1978).
18. People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). The
court cites 1 Hale P.C. 491 (1736) in support of its conclusion that necessity has tradi-
tionally been an available defense in prison escape cases.
A Delaware court has ruled that prison conditions would not justify escape unless
an emergency, such as a fire, required action other than redress through the courts.
State v. Palmer, 72 A.2d 442 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950).
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rejected was in Regina v. Dudley and Stevens,19 in which shipwrecked
sailors were prosecuted for having kidUed their companions and cannibalized
their remains to save themselves from starvation. The court rejected the
argument that necessity could justify the homicide of an innocent person.
This conclusion apparently limits the applicability of the necessity defense.
Interestingly, the outcome of the case points to another long-standing
characteristic of the defense: although the court refused to condone the
conduct of the sailors as justified by legal principle, the sentence imposed
was relatively slight considering the nature of the offense. Thus, while
courts may be reluctant to justify the defendant's claim of necessity, such
factors and evidence generally are available to the defendant to mitigate
punishment.21 Mitigation in the punishment stage of criminal proceedings,
an important concept in the administration of criminal law, may be respon-
sible for the rather erratic and unspectacular development of the neces-
sity defense over the past two hundred years. The availability of other
grounds for justification, such as self-defense, may also have hindered the
expansion of necessity as a justification defense in criminal prosecutions.
Most successful uses of the defense of necessity in American courts
have involved relatively minor violations of the law. Necessity has been
asserted in traffic offense prosecutions,m as well as civil cases involving
destruction of property to prevent the spread of fire or diseaseF- and
withdrawal of a sick child from school without permission. 5 A Wyoming
decision approved the use of the defense in a prosecution for violation of
wildlife hunting laws when prevention of the destruction of property .vas
involved 26 Recently a Minnesota court rejected the defense in a traffic
violation case, but did not repudiate it in concept.27
Perhaps the most significant use of the defense in an American court
19. Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] All E.R. 61 (Q.B.). See also United
States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842), a shipwreck case in which thejury, instructed on the defense of necessity, returned a verdict of guilty against a
seaman charged with throwing passengers overboard to lighten a sinking life raft. The
defendant was sentenced to six months at hard labor and a fine of twenty dollars
upon his conviction for manslaughter.
20. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 2, at 295 n.80.
21. E.g., United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 366, 369. Similarly, while rejecting
the asserted defense of economic necessity the Washington Supreme Court has noted
the general acceptance by courts of evidence concerning the defendant's economic
motives as a basis for mitigation in the punishment stage of the criminal proceedings
against him. State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 307-08 24 P.2d 638, 640 (1933).
22. State v. Burton, 41 R.I. 303, 103 A. 962 (1918).
23. Keller v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614 (1879).
24. Seavey v. Preble, 64 Me. 120 (1874) (doctor's reliance on necessity defense
in suit for damages for trespass to property upheld when destruction of property was
necessitated by antismailpox epidemic procedures).
25. State v. Johnson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902).
26. Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962).
27. State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 266, 183 N.W.2d 541 (1971).
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in this century was State v. Wootton,8 an Arizona case replete with political
overtones. In response to a called strike of copper miners by the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) in 1917, an Arizona sheriff raised a posse
of more than 1,000 men and proceeded to arrest the strikers and their
supporters. The arrestees were taken to Hermanos, New Mexico, and
turned over to federal troops. The deportation of the workers, which was
not effected under a declaration of martial law, resulted in prosecution
of many of the posse members for kidnapping. One posse member asserted
the defense of necessity and offered evidence that his actions were the
result of his apprehension concerning the motives of the IWW, which
he claimed to believe was plotting to overthrow the government. Further-
more, he offered testimony that the presence of the IWW members threat-
ened the safety of the community and that the actions of the posse could
be traced to the necessity for removing this threat to the lives and prop-
erty of the community. The trial court charged the jury on the defendant's
theory of defense, noting the propriety in allowing the jury to decide the
issue when raised by any evidence. The jury returned a verdict of not
guilty after a fifteen minute deliberation.
The Wootton case demonstrates two peculiar aspects of the defense
of necessity which may engender an adverse response to the defense by the
legislature and the courts. First, Wootton's defense was essentially political
in nature. His reliance on the threat of conspiracy by the IWW was
critical to his claimed belief that the union membership was about to
launch an attack on the inhabitants of the community and damage property.
Second, the defense proved useful in justifying the violation of the political
rights and liberties of a minority within the community by others acting
ostensibly under color of law.
This situation presents an interesting contrast to statutes enacted by
legislatures fearful that individuals would use the necessity defense to
justify criminal acts allegedly committed on the basis of moral, political,
or ideological opposition to the statute.29 These statutes specifically exclude
use of the defense when offered solely on those grounds. In Wootton, by
contrast, the act done was justified by the need to prevent others from
engaging in conduct that might ultimately prove criminal in nature. Rather
than a member of a political minority seeking to justify a political crime
28. State v. Wootton, No. 2685 (Cochise City, Ariz., Sept. 13, 1919) cited In
Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation Case, 3 Aiuz.
L. REV. 264 (1961), and in Arnolds & Garland, supra note 2, at 292-94.
29. The following state statutes establishing a legislatively created defense of
necessity specifically exclude reliance either on the defense of necessity when the actor
claims his criminal act was justified on moral grounds, or on objection to the desirability
of the penal statute violated: Amu. STAT. ANN. § 41-504(2) (1977); COLO REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-1-702(2) (1973); DEL-. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1974); ME . REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103 (1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1974); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 35.05 (McKinney 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1977).
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on the basis of opposition to the statute on some moral ground, a member
of the political majority successfully used the defense to justify oppression
of the minority.
In light of Wootton it would seem that no impediment exists to reliance
on the necessity defense by an official acting under color of state law or by
any other person who could link his conduct to the need to avert some
danger posed by a political minority. Hence, the statutory limitationsa
that render the defense unavailable to persons committing crimes of political
conscience might not serve to restrict reliance by those persons who would
violate individual rights and later claim justification on the same basis
as that asserted by Wootton.2' An interesting chapter in the history of the
defense might have been written had the Watergate defendants gone to
trial on the theory that considerations of national security and internal
threats to the government justified their actions. 2
Prior to enactment of the Texas Penal Code in 1974, Texas common
law on necessity was inconsistent On several occasions the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals had considered the availability of the necessity defense
with varying results.13 In Woods v. State3 4 the court ruled that the defense
30. Typically, the restrictive language is similar to that of the New York statute:
"The necessity and justification of such conduct may not rest upon consideration pertain-
ing only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general applier/on
or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder." N.Y.
PE A-L LAW § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1975).
31. The general rule with regard to the necessity defense is that some actual
threat must be perceived by the actor, sufficient in terms of its character, imminence,
and quality to reasonably justify the illegal action taken. Sea J. HALL, CN mur Pan-
cnLr.s oF THE C Am, .I.LAw 416 (2d ed. 1960); WHAnro;s Cr mAL LAW §§ 88
(Torcia ed. 1978).
32. See Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HAHm 's, May 1977, at35, 42.
t 33. Interestingly, much of the case law with regard to necessity involved defenses
to charges brought in connection with alleged violation of the Sunday closing laws.
In reviewing the cases, the courts have engaged in an evaluation of the work performed
and whether it is essential that it be performed on Sunday. The standard applied was
not whether there was an absolute, unavoidable, physical necessity that the work be
performed on Sunday, but whether an economic and moral necessity justifying the
work could be established. Lane v. State, 68 Teax. Crim. 4, 7, 150 S.W. 637, 638 (1912)(work performed under a construction contract). See also Hennersdorf v. State, 25 Tex.
Crim. 597, 8 S.W. 926 (1888) (ice house operation); Nelson v. State, 25 Teax. Crim.
599, 8 S.W. 927 (1888) (blacksmithing horses a g United States mail); Ex Parte
Kennedy, 42 Tex. Crim. 148, 58 S.V. 129 (1900) (barbering). The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the activities pleaded as necessary in Hcnncrsdorf and Nelson were
necessary and could be raised as a defense to prosecution for failing to observe the
prohibition against Sunday labor.
34. 135 Teax. Crim. 540, 121 S.W. 604 (1938). In another prosecution for failing
to stop and render aid the defendant was convicted by a jury after raising a necessity-
related defense. The defendant had injured a Mexican-American child in an accident
involving his automobile. He alleged that he failed to stop and render aid because a
crowd of Mexican-Americans had gathered at the scene of the accident and he feared
they would injure him if he returned to the injured child. The jury was charged on his
fear of being in danger of bodily harm but the defendant was still convicted. The
conviction was affirmed on appeal Greer v. State, 108 Teax. Crim. 356, 300 S.W. 640
(1927).
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was available to a criminal defendant. The defendant had been charged
with failing to stop and render aid at the scene of an accident. He testified
that he failed to stop and render aid because he had an injured pas-
senger in his own vehicle who required immediate emergency medical
assistance. The trial court refused to charge the jury on the issue of neces-
sity. The reviewing court held this refusal to be error, concluding that
when the issue of necessity is raised by the evidence it is "incumbent on
the court to charge the jury fully and affirmatively as to the law applying
thereto, whether the evidence raising such issue be strong or weak, un-
impeached or contradicted. "
Although the Woods court clearly relied on its understanding of a
common law defense of necessity and recognized it as applicable in
Texas prosecutions, 36 this ruling was not followed in two subsequent cases
brought before the court, apparently on the ground that the defense had
not been expressly authorized by legislative enactment. The court refused
to find error in trial court denials of a requested charge relating to neces-
sity as a defense in Butterfield v. State37 and Sansom v. State."8 In both
cases the record before the court demonstrated that the defendant bad
voluntarily become intoxicated and, subsequently, sought to use the neces-
sity defense to justify driving while under the influence of intoxicants
ostensibly because of a need for emergency medical treatment. The court's
less sympathetic treatment of the appellants' arguments, in comparison
to the earlier holding of Woods, might be traced either to the legitimacy
of the defense when a defendant's conduct has itself contributed to the
necessity or to a concern on the part of the court in approving this type
of defense in cases involving intoxication. 39
The threat that the defense might easily be raised in any circum-
stance in which the defendant could make a plausible argument for
driving while intoxicated, even the need to transport himself from the
tavern to his home, did not clearly surface in the opinions. Rather, in both
Butterfield and Sansom, the court ruled that no indication could be found
that the defense was available to defendants under Texas law, ignoring
its prior decision in Woods. This prompted a dissent from Judge Davidson
in Butterfield in which he described the availability of the defense at the
common law.40
35. Id. at 605.
36. Id.
37. 167 Tex. Crim. 64, 317 S.W.2d 943 (1958).
38. 390 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
39. Id. at 280. The Sansom court concluded, "If appellant here is found In a
predicament, it is of his own doing, and he may not by such conduct claim the benefit
of a defense to which he is not entitled." Id.
40. "The law has long recognized that a criminal offense may be excused if
committed under necessity." 167 Tex. Crim. at 66, 317 S.W.2d at 944 (Davidson, J.,
dissenting).
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In Harris v. State,41 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the
argument of a defendant in a burglary prosecution who asserted economic
necessity as a defense. The indictment charged the defendant with bur-
glary with intent to commit theft In rejecting the necessity defense, the
court ruled that "[e]conomic necessity is not justification for a positive
criminal offense."- Whether the court was expressing its position regard-
ing defense of necessity in general is unclear, since its language refers
specifically to "economic" necessity.
The Harris court's opinion reflects the position taken by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court in 1933. In State v. Moe4" the court reviewed the con-
viction for grand larceny and riot of an individual who had been arrested
with a group of unemployed persons demonstrating for more flour. In
the midst of the Depression, the group had first sought additional food
from the local Red Cross commissary. When turned down, they marched
to a local store and seized the food that they claimed they needed for
continued survival. The Washington court rejected the necessity defense,
observing that "economic necessity has never been accepted as a defense
to a criminal charge."M The court noted that to extend judicial approval
to such a defense would entail sanctioning lawlessness. 5 The court in-
dicated, however, that economic factors might be offered as evidence to
mitigate punishment.46
The position of both the Texas and Washington courts seems clear:
Economic necessity cannot be recognized as a defense in criminal prosecu-
tions47 Regardless of whether the Texas court's restricted view toward use
of the necessity defense in recent years may be traced to strict reliance on
statutory enactments or concern that recognition of this defense by the
courts could lead to widespread abuse, use of the defense has seldom
been reviewed. The issue possibly could have failed to reach the review-
ing court because of favorable disposition at the trial level either by an
acquittal on other grounds or by achieving the desired impact at the
punishment stage of trial. Additionally, the lack of statutory authorization
prior to 1974 may have discouraged use of the defense at the trial level.
41. 486 S.V.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
42. Id. at 574.
43. 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1933).
44. Id. at 305, 24 P.2d at 640.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. In United States v. Palmer, 458 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1974), the court rejected
defendant's asserted defense of economic necessity in a deportation prosecution. The
court seemed to confuse the concepts of necessity and duress, ruling that a compulsion
or duress theory could not be offered absent a threat of harm to a person, rather than
property. Id. at 665.
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II. NECESSITY BY STATUTE
A. Statutory Provisions
Texas is one of thirteen jurisdictions to statutorily recognize the de-
fense of necessity.48 Other jurisdictions may recognize the defense as a
result of common law tradition, judicial recognition, or with regard to
specific offenses. All the statutory enactments roughly follow the outline
of the defense provided in section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code.49 The
Model Penal Code provision establishes the parameters of the defense both
in terms of the conduct involved and in terms of other statutory provisions
that may logically have a bearing on the availability of the defense in
the individual prosecution. Thus, subsection (1) (a) establishes the critical
hurdle for the defendant: that he be able to show that his act in violation
of the law was of less harm than that harm which he perceived would
have resulted in the absence of his act.50 A qualification of this require-
ment is that the defendant, through his own negligence or recklessness,
not have caused the situation resulting in the need to make a decision
in which the defendant faced a less harmful alternative involving violation
of the law.5' When the culpability sufficient to convict involves only
48. Jurisdictions that have a statutorily enacted defense of'necessity include:
Arkansas, Apu. STAT. ANN. § 41-504 (1977); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 18-1-702 (1973); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1974)); Hawaii, HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 703-302 (1976); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smlth-Hurd
1972); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (Baldwin 1975); Maine, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103 (1978); New Ham pshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3(1974); New York, N.Y. PEN w § 35.05(2) (MeKinney 1975); Oregon, OnE.
REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1977); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 503 (Pur-
don 1973); Texas, TEx. PNu. CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974); and Wisconsin Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West 1958). For an excellent treatment of the history and factors
essential in legislating the defense of necessity, see Tiffany & Anderson, Legislating the
Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DEN. L.J. 839 (1975).
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL CODs].
This section provides:
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil
to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides excep-
tions of defenses dealing with the specific situations involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not
otherwise plainly appear.(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation
requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his
conduct, the justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prose-
cution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may
be, suffices to establish culpability.
Id.
50. Id. § 3.02(1)(a).
51. Id. 3.02(2).
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recklessness or negligence, this section of the code would deny the neces-
sity defense to the defendant.
A second area of limitation imposed on the defense involves the
relationship of the statutory provision with other statutes. The defense is
not available when another defense or exception to prosecution has been
specifically provided by law.52 A less clearly defined limiting provision
provides that the defense is not available if a legislative purpose to ex-
clude the justification claimed is apparent.r The form or context required
for such an exclusion is not established.
The Texas Legislature enacted section 9.0 of the Texas Penal Code,
roughly adopting the standards of the Model Penal Code. Section 9.22
is as follows:
Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is necessary
to avoid imminent harm;
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly
outveigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the
harm sought to be prevented by the law prescribing the conduct;
and
(8) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed
for the conduct does not plainly appear.51
The provision differs from the Model Penal Code provision in one signif-
icant aspect: the Texas statute does not include the limitation excluding
the defense in those situations in which the actor's own recklessness or
negligence may have created the situation calling for his decision to violate
the penal law to avoid the greater harmnY 5 Somewhat less significantly,
the Texas statute does not follow the lead of the Model Penal Code in
limiting use of the defense in those situations in which another exception
or defense has been specifically provided by the legislature.*" This con-
ceivably could give rise to a charge on both an affirmative defense spe-
cifically related to the offense charged, such as self-defense, and on the
defense of necessity. The ultimate ground of justification relied upon
could, therefore, be argued to the jury in a more abstract fashion claiming,
for example, reliance on the moral rightness of the act.
B. Limitations on Assertion of the Defense of Necessity
The legislative provisions creating the defense of necessity impose
three significant limitations on the availability of the necessity defense.
First, the majority of state statutes have been drafted to follow the lead
52. Id.§ 3.02(1)(b).
53. Id. §3.02(1)(c).
54. Tm. PENAL CODEA-N. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974).
55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) (1962).
56. Seeid. §3.02 (1) (b).
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of the model statute by restricting use of the defense in situations where
the actor's own recklessness or negligence may have created or contributed
to the situation where a criminal statute was violated.? Interestingly,
the omission of such a provision from the Texas statute raises a question
concerning the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' consideration of the
necessity defense in the Sansom and Butterfield cases. Despite the con-
clusion by the court that the defense was not available in Texas, these
opinions betray hostility toward the defense when raised by defendants
charged with operating motor vehicles while voluntarily intoxicated."8
The Texas Legislature seemingly missed an opportunity to restrict the
availability of the defense in exactly this situation, although, arguably,
the act of becoming voluntarily intoxicated does not, in itself, raise the
issue of recklessness or negligence on the part of the defendant. 9
Second, several of the state statutes limit the use of the defense with
regard to the motive for the defendant's action.60 The defendant is, there-
fore, not permitted to raise the necessity defense in situations in which a
criminal act is based on a moral ground or protest of the statute violated.
This would appear to be an effort to prevent reliance on the necessity
defense for reaching the jury on the basis of nullification.61 Hence, political
57. Statutes defining the defense of necessity in the following states have some
type of exclusion based on the defendant's own negligence or recklessness in causing
or contributing to the adverse situation in which he finds himself: Aium. SrAT. ANN.§ 41-504(3) (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702(l) (1973); DEL. CoDE ANN.
tit. 11, § 463 (1974); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 703-302(2) (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 503.030 (Baldwin 1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103 (1978); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 627.3 (II) (1974); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.05(2) (MeKinney 1975);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 503(b) (Purdon 1973). Interestingly, there is a split
in the wording of these statutes with regard to the limiting effect of the provision.
Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania have followed
the lead of the Model Penal Code and provide that the defendant's own negligence
or recklessness will bar the use of a defense in a prosecution for an offense for which
negligence or recklessness is sufficient to establish culpability. The rovision in the
Colorado, Delaware, and New York statutes looks to whether the defendant's own
conduct created the situation, or whether the defendant was at fault in any respect
in the creation of the situation, giving rise to his choice to violate the statute to avoid
some greater harm. The language of these statutes would appear to deny access to
the defendant, regardless of whether his conduct met the statutory requirement of
culpability in terms of intent, when he is at fault in the situation that necessitates his
choice of action violating the penal law.
58. Refer to text accompanying notes 38 & 39 supra.
59. Using the Model Penal Code formula, the legislative action might not reach
this situation. Employing the language of those state statutes not following the model
statute, however, the legislature clearly could have limited the availability of the
defense in precisely this fashion. Refer to note 57 supra.
60. Refer to note 29 supra. The states legislating this particular exclusion are:
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, and Oregon.
61. Amolds and Garland discuss the qualitative difference between the necessity
instruction and the jury nullification instruction, which may authorize a verdict of not
guilty in spite of instruction on the applicable law, based on a decision of conscience
reached by the jury. They note that the necessity instruction is much more narrow,
allowing acquittal only if the jurors find that the defendant's act represented a rea-
soned response to a threatened harm or injury of greater weight. Thus, the jury is
not allowed to make a general ruling based on its feelings as to the advisability of
the statute. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 2, at 298.
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crimes, such as those growing out of opposition to the draft or a military
action perceived by the actor to be immoral, could not be defended on
the basis of necessity absent some imminent harm threatening the individual
actor.
62
The Texas statute does not include this limiting provision, although
such a limitation of the defense will likely be reached through other means.
In weighing the competing harms facing the actor who is forced, in his
own judgment, to commit a violation of the law, the courts could apply
the definition of "harm" provided by the Penal Code. Harm is defined as
"anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including
harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected is interested."M
Although this definition would appear broad enough for precisely the type
of reliance claimed by the political defendant, including a perceived interest
in the welfare of society and its individuals," the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals could limit the final clause to those persons in whom the actor's
interest could be related through legal or familial duty.
A third limitation appears in the language of only the ColoradoP and
New York66 statutes. The courts there are instructed to evaluate the de-
fendant's evidence of necessity before charging the jury on the defense
and allowing the defendant to present his theory. If the court finds that
the evidence presented by the defendant is sufficient to establish a legal
defense of necessity, in conformity with the terms of the statute, then the
judge may allow the defendant to submit his theory of defense to the jury.
This is far more restrictive than the application of the defense by the
Texas court in Woods, in which the court ruled that the judge must submit
the defense and charge the jury on necessity when it is raised by any
evidence offered by the defendant.67
62. See United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972), a case involving
destruction of Selective Service records by an opponent prtesting United States military
action in Southeast Asia. The defendant sought reversal of his conviction on the basis
of the trial court's failure to charge the jury on the defense of necessity. He also sought
to raise the issue of jury nullification. The conviction was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit which, although recognizing the model statutes basis for the defense, held
that the defendant could not establish a causal relationship between his act and the
evil he sought to avoid: the war. Arnolds and Garland speculate as to whether this
is a reasonable assumption, given the fact that the end of the war must, in part, be
traced to objections raised by members of the community in positions of responsibility.
Arnolds & Garland, supra note 2, at 300 nn.127-28.
63. TX. PENAL CODEANN. § 1.07(16) (Vernon 1974).
64. This is precisely the type of issue raised hy political prosecutions, particularly
in the prosecution of opponents of the Vietnam War for their efforts to obstruct the
operation of the Selective Service System. See United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d
556 (7th Cir. 1973); Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 148 n.21 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 391 n.12 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1969). In these prosecutions defendants sought
unsuccessfully to raise the defense of necessity at the trial level.
65. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-702(2) (1973).
66. N. Y. PENAL LAw § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1975).
67. Woods v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 540, 542, 121 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1938).
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The direction to be taken by the Texas courts in shaping the statutory
defense is unclear but may well involve supplying judicial limitation to
the defense in areas left unaffected by the legislature. Specifically, the
Texas statute sets out the standards by which the jury may evaluate the
defendant's conduct in the light of his claimed justification. Subsections 1
and 2 are directed toward the harm the defendant claims to have faced
at the time he violated a criminal statute. 3 They focus on the imminence
of the threat, the need for immediate action to avoid the harm, and the
weighing of the harms involved to determine if the alleged basis for
justification actually appeared reasonable in the defendant's situation.
Subsection 3 follows the model statute by excluding reliance on the
defense in cases in which the legislature has evidenced its intention to
exclude availability of the justification.6" This provision is likely to prove
a continuing source of trouble to the defense bar. Clearly, no statute limits
the defense as applied in any prior cases, and no statutory language
specifically excludes use of the defense in prosecutions for violations of
particular statutes. The provision seems to grant the legislature the option
to exclude use of the necessity defense in specific, future prosecutions.
The danger is that the court may find evidence of legislative intention
to exclude the justification defense in cases in which the legislature has
not specifically spoken. In the absence of specific legislative exclusion,
however, it would appear that the defense could be raised in any prosecu-
tion by presenting evidence that would raise an issue of necessity.
C. Application of the Texas Necessity Statute
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of a requested
charge concerning necessity as a justification in Roy v. State.70 The de-
fendant was convicted of unlawfully carrying a weapon. At trial he alleged
that he was arrested in a high crime area where it was necessary that he
be armed to protect himself. The trial court ruled that he could not develop
the necessity defense by offering the testimony of arresting officers that
the area in which the arrest had occurred was, indeed, a high crime area
and that police patrols in the area were inadequate to prevent crime.71
The court affirmed the trial court's ruling, noting that the defense
must meet the three-pronged thrust of section 9.22 to avail itself of this
justification defense.72 The reviewing court held that the defense had
failed in this respect because it did not demonstrate immediacy of the
68. TEX. PENA CODE ANN. § 9.22(1), (2) (Vernon 1974).
69. Id. § 9.22(3).
70. 552 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
71. Id. at 830-31.
72. Id.
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need to avoid imminent harm. Furthermore, the court observed that the
defense would sanction the carrying of prohibited weapons in contraven-
tion of the legislative intent7 embodied in the statute that creates the
offense of unlawfully carrying weapons. 4 The court observed that allowing
individuals to carry weapons in high crime areas would only serve to
exacerbate the problem of crime.75
Essentially, the Roy opinion reveals how the court will limit the use
of the necessity defense. The direction taken by the court may seriously
jeopardize the utility of the defense for defendants, particularly if the court
is willing to find that no violation of a statute can satisfy the condition of
subsection 3. The existence of the criminal offense itself could always be
used to demonstrate the legislative intent to exclude this justification. Such
a pattern of statutory construction by the court would emasculate the
statute, effectively abrogating the legislative intent implicit in its inclusion
in the Penal Code.
A more limited reading of the court's decision in Roy, however, would
look to the pragmatic considerations before the court. The legislature
clearly seeks to reduce crime, particularly violent crime, by penalizing
the unauthorized possession of weapons. To permit the carrying of a
weapon on the grounds that others, with a criminal intent, are carrying
weapons or participating in criminal activity in a specific area would frus-
trate the specific goal of the legislature. This is a reasonable explanation
of the court's action, particularly since the offense involved is one virtually
predicated on a concept of strict liability, rather than an act requiring
specific criminal intent.76 The notion of justification is designed to mitigate
or cancel criminal intent, substituting a non-criminal or justifiable intent.
The danger in this posture is that it leads to the former in logical
sequence: any enactment of a penal offense expresses a legislative policy
for the punishment of the act, thus implicitly a legislative policy counter
to justification. Therefore, the middle road, which accepts this reality
while admitting that the legislature has authorized the use of the justifica-
tion of necessity, may prove difficult for the Court of Criminal Appeals to
follow. The court may find its role made easier, however, in evaluating
individual cases in terms of the immediacy and imminence of the threat-
73. Id. at 831.
74. TX. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974).
75. 522 S.V.2d at 831.
76. The intent in an unlawfully carrying weapons case is supplied by the actor's
carrying of the weapon. No intent to commit any other criminal offense or to make
any unlawful use of the weapon is needed for conviction. TE=. Ppzu. CODE A,-.
§ 46.02 (Vernon 1974). As a result, a number of acts which would otherwise be illegal
are specifically excepted: (1) engaging in security activity, (2) traveling or hunting,
and (3) carrying weapons on ones own premises. Id. § 46.03. In one sense, then, the
legislature has expressed its intent with regard to what acts are justifiable.
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ened harm and the relative weight of harms involved in violating or
complying with the statute.
A more interesting question would have been raised by Roy had the
actor actually been victimized by criminal actions immediately prior to
his arrest, and thus, could have demonstrated immediacy and imminence,
at least after the fact. This type of event would certainly have served to
confirm the accuracy of the defendant's apprehension of traveling in a
high crime area.
III. NVc-EssiTy: A DEFENSE TO WELFmA FRAuD?
The Court of Criminal Appeals could face another question regarding
availability of the necessity defense in the near future. Mayfield v. State,77
presently in the appeals process, seeks review of a conviction for welfare
fraud. The trial judge denied a requested jury instruction relating to the
defense of necessity, concluding that the evidence had failed to raise the
issue. The case had been prosecuted under the then-applicable statute
which governed welfare fraud providing a maximum punishment of two
years and fine of $500.78 The information charged the defendant with
fraudulently obtaining assistance through the Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) program79 to which she was not entitled by
virtue of her failure to report earned income to welfare department case-
workers. The defendant admitted that she had, in fact, failed to report her
employment or earnings to her caseworker and had filed false reports
during the period of time when she was receiving benefits in which she
denied that she was working.
The defense presented the evidence of three expert witnesses to
establish the grounds for its requested instruction on necessity. A medical
doctor, qualified as an expert on nutrition for young children, testified
that the defendant's children were suffering from nutritional deficiencies in
77. No. 56,431 (Tex. Crim. App., filed April 25, 1979). The Mayfield case was
tried September 8-12, 1976. The defendant was found guilty and assessed a fine of
$75. She was represented at trial by Roark M. Reed a member of the Texas Bar and
Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic at the Southern Methodist University School
of Law. All references to this case are taken from the transcri t of the proceedings
and the briefs for appellant and appellee, filed respectively by the defendant's counsel
on appeal, Professor Reed and the author, and by the Dallas County District Attor-
ney's office.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction in Mayfield because
the trial court's charge contained fundamental error in authorizing conviction on a
theory not alleged in the information. The court failed to reach the issue of appellant's
requested instruction on the defensive theory of necessity. The state has filed a motion
for rehearing en bane which is currently pending.
78. 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 562, § 34, at 924. The penalty provision of this
statute has been repealed by amendment. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 695c § 34
(Vernon Supp. 1978).
79. Social Security Act § 402(a), 42 U.S.C. § 602a (1970).
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their diet resulting from the lack of resources available to the family to
purchase food containing the required level of protein. He also offered his
opinion that the children were suffering from starvation, according to the
medical definition of that term.
A registered nurse, who had examined the defendant's children prior
to the date on which the defendant began worldng, testified that the
children were suffering from nutritional problems and asthma. The defense
also qualified an economist on standards of living, who testified that the
failure of the Department of Public Welfare to adjust the benefit levels
available to qualified recipients over the period from 1969 to 1974 (the
date of the alleged fraud) had resulted in a net loss of buying power of
thirty percent for recipients.
Previously, the defense elicited testimony from state witnesses em-
ployed by the welfare department that showed the level of benefits granted
recipients to be only seventy-five percent of that computed to be needed
by families for a subsistence level of living. 0 Hence, recipients received
no more than seventy-five percent of the amount of assistance established
to meet minimum standards of living, the figures used were computed in
1969, and a thirty percent loss of purchasing power had occurred by the
time of defendant's alleged fraud in 1974.
Despite the evidence offered by the defense, the trial court held that
the issue of necessity had not been raised and denied defendant's requested
jury instruction. The position of the court in Woods would seem to mandate
instruction since the quality of evidence is not a factor to be considered
by the trial court in its ruling on the charge. The Woods court held that
the defendant was entitled to the instruction "whether the evidence raising
such issue be strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted."8 1
A careful reading of the necessity statute also leads to the conclusion
that the defendant in Mayfield was entitled to her requested instruction
on necessity. First, the testimony demonstrated a clear innediate need:
that of additional income for the purchase of food; and an imminent harm
to be avoided: starvation suffered by defendant's children as a result of
nutritional deprivation s2 Second, the relative harms were put in issue by
the evidence such that they should be weighed by the jury in its delib-
eration.'3 The harm sought to be prevented by the conduct is economic
loss to the state through fraudulent abuse of the welfare programs that
provide public assistance to the deprived and economically disadvantaged.
The harm sought to be avoided by the actor was long-term, serious physical
80. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546, 549 (1972), in which the
Supreme Court upheld the 75% distribution scheme and denied appellants equal
protection claim.
81. 135 Tex. Crim. at 542, 121 S.W.2d at 605.
82. See Tx. Pr,.ACoDrANN. § 9.22(1) (Vernon 1974).
83. Id. § 9.22(2).
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and mental disability attributable to nutritional deprivation during the
childhood of defendant's children. This is the type of evidence that may
create a legitimate balancing test, for jury determination, with regard to
whether the harm perceived by the actor as necessitating the commission
of a criminal offense does, in fact, outweigh the harm attributable to the
violation of the statute. By refusing the instruction, the court ruled on the
issue as a question of law rather than fact. When the defendant has elected
jury trial, such action by the court could amount to an abuse of dis-
cretion by effectively denying defendant access to a statutorily approved
defense.
In assessing the impact of subsection 384 on prosecution for welfare
fraud, it is instructive to consider statutory provisions that impose affirma-
tive duties upon an actor who is a parent pleading the criminal act was
necessitated by the immediate welfare of his or her children. Both the
Texas Family Code and the Penal Code address the duty of the parent
to provide for the welfare of dependent children. The Family Code man-
dates an affirmative duty upon the parent to provide for the welfare of the
dependent child85 and creates civil penalties for neglect of the parental
duty to the detriment of the dependent child. 6 The Penal Code imposes
criminal sanctions for failure to provide support for the dependent child
or spouse,87 although an affirmative defense to prosecution is available
in the event of financial or other inability to provide support.8 The
importance of these sections, as well as those which require payment of
court-ordered child support as a result of a valid child custody order,"
is that parents are on notice that the law expresses certain defined ex-
pectations of parental support for the welfare and health of their dependent
children. Thus, rather than looking to subsection 3 as a limitation on the
use of the necessity defense"0 the defendant may anticipate the issue by
noting statutory provisions by which he is legally required to support his
children. Since AFDC benefit eligibility is predicated on existence of
dependent children in the home of the assistance recipient,9" prosecution
84. Id. § 9.22(3).
85. Tax. F.m. CODE § 12.04(3) (Vernon 1975).
86. Id. § 15.02(1)(c)-(e).
87. T~x. PnE1AL CODE ANN. § 25.05(a) (Vernon 1974).
88. Id. § 25.05(f).
89. TEx. FAM. CODE § 12.04(3) (Vernon 1975).
90. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22(3) (Vernon 1974).
91. The State's reply to appellant's argument on appeal in Mayteld was that the
trial court had not erred in denying a requested instruction on the defense of necessity
relying in part on § 9.22(3). The State argued that there was a legislative purpose
to exclude the justification claimed, referring to section 35 of the Public Welfare Act of
1941 that provides: "The purpose of this Act is to inaugurate a program of social
security and to provide necessary and prompt assistance to the citizens of this State
who are entitled to avail themselves of its provisions." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
695c, § 35 (Vernon 1964). The argument is essentially that the ineligibility for bene-
fits alleged as to defendant rendered her without recourse to the defense of necessity
[Vol. 10:333
TEXAS DEFENSE OF NECESSITY
for AFDC fraud offers an appropriate situation for assertion of the neces-
sity defense. The essential factor is the assertion by the defendant that any
fraud committed was the result of an immediate need to deal with animminent harm outweighing any harm caused by violation of the statute.
This would seem to establish defendant's reliance on the defense and entitle
her to the requested instruction.
The legislature recently has authorized prosecution for welfare fraud
under the general theft statutes.3- Previously, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals had held that welfare fraud prosecutions could not be commenced
under the theft provisions,93 thus restricting the penalty range for the
offense by excluding prosecution under a felony statute. The legislature's
action requires welfare fraud prosecutions to be brought upon indictment
and tried as felonies in district courts when the amount of the alleged
fraud exceeds $200.95
The prospect of felony prosecution for welfare fraud may make the
defense particularly attractive since the state may be able to document
all aspects of its case with respect to non-reported earnings with applica-
tions signed by the recipient containing fraudulent information or answers
and with payroll and benefit payment records. As in Woods the threatened
harm concerns a third party who stands to suffer great injury in the
absence of the actor's criminal act.6 Moreover, the third party is a child
dependent upon the parent-actor in whom the law has vested an obligation
for support97 This would seem a more preferable situation for assertion
of the necessity defense than that presented by Butterfield, Sansorn, and
Roy in which the object of the actor's concern was the safety and well-being
of the actor himself. When the actor engages in a pattern of conduct cre-
ating the threat of harm upon which he seeks to justify avoidance
through an otherwise criminal act, it appears likely the court will take
a stricter view of the statutory requirements in light of the evidence
allegedly raising the issue of necessity.
The impact of Harris v. State9s on the use of the necessity defense in
welfare fraud prosecution should be considered. The court's emphatic
conclusion that economic necessity offers no defense to a positive criminal
in a prosecution in which she is charged with fraudulently receiving benefits for
which she was ineligible. This argument vould deny the defense to anyone charged
with an offense, since obviously the legislature expressed its interest in prohibiting
the conduct with the passage of the statute.
92. TEx. CnMa. CODE ANN. § 31.02 (Vernon 1974).
93. Jones v. State, 552 S.W.2d 836 (Te. Crim. App. 1977).
94. Tm. CODE Ci. PRo. ANN. art. 4.05 (Vernon 1974).
95. TEX. PENAL CODEANN. §§ 31.03(d) (4), (5) (Vernon 1974).
96. In Woods, the defendant's passenger testified that she had asked the
defendant to take her home immediately after she was injured in the collision. 135
Tex. Crim. at 541, 121 S.,V.2d at 604.
97. Refer to notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
98. 486 S.V.2d 573 (Ter. Crim. App. 1972).
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charge9 should, in fact, be reversed by virtue of legislative authorization
of the defense in the enactment of the Penal Code in 1974. The Penal
Code provides no exclusion of use with regard to specific offenses or with
regard to prior holdings of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus,
even though prosecutions for welfare fraud must be commenced under the
general theft statute, there would appear to be no impediment to assertion
of the defense of necessity.
Second, although a defendant charged with welfare fraud who asserts
the defense of necessity clearly relies on a theory of economic necessity,
the situation may vary significantly from the normal use of the defense in
theft cases. Welfare benefits available under the Social Security Act of
1936 (Act), principally the AFDC program, are only available to families
with dependent children and insufficient economic resources to provide for
basic human necessities. 100 Hence, the goal of the Act is to provide bene-
fits to these children rather than to the parents directly. The welfare
fraud defendant can, therefore, almost certainly defend against the theft
charge by interposing the interests of the children who are completely with-
out culpability.1" Prosecution for welfare fraud would seem ideally suited
for reliance upon the defense of necessity when the fact situation suggests
such an approach, and particularly when expert testimony may be offered
adding validity to the perceptions of the defendant who claims a need to
protect her children from a perceived threat of imminent harm.
IV. RECOGNrION OF TBE DEFENSE oF NECESITY IN PIUSON EscAPE CASEs
California, Illinois and Michigan, in dealing with the problem of
the necessity or coercion/duress defense in cases involving escape from a
penal institution, have authorized use of the defense when warranted by
the set of facts present in the individual's act of escape.102 Generally, the
99. Id. at 574.
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602a, 602a(7).
101. Comparing § 9.22, which looks to avoidance of harm with § 1.07(a)(10),
which defines harm to include threatening a third person in whom the actor has an
interest, it would appear clear that the defense could be asserted in this case if the
actor's children were threatened with serious deprivation. Compare Tm. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 9.22 with § 1.07(a)(16). In this context, it is interesting to note that the
Penal Code authorizes use of force or deadly force in the defense of a third person.
Id. § 9.33. Force is justified if "the actor reasonably believes his intervention Is
immediately necessary to protect the third person." Id. § 9.33(2) (emphasis added).
In City of Chicago v. Mayer, 56 Ill. 2d 366, 308 N.E.2d 601 (1974), a third-year
medical student was charged with disorderly conduct and interfering with police
when he intervened to stop officers from moving an injured man. The reviewing court
reversed based upon the trial court's failure to grant defendant's requested charge
on necessity.
102. People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974);
People v. Unger, 33 Ill. App. 3d 770, 338 N.E.2d 442 (1975); People v. Harmon,
53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187(1975). See generally Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape
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cases involved situations in which the defendant offered evidence that
the escape was necessitated by the threat of homosexual assault and a
failure of the institution to properly safeguard the personal integrity of
the individual inmate. The analysis offered by reviewing courts in these
cases, however, differed somewhat in terms of the theoretical basis for the
defense asserted.
A. The Defense of Duress/Coercion
A Michigan court has approved a defendant's use of the defense of
duress to prosecution for escape.103 The distinction between duress or
coercion and necessity may appear to be simply academic but could
prove significant for Texas courts'04 as well as other courts relying on
specific statutory language creating the defense. Duress refers to a situa-
tion in which the actor commits the offense because of some immediate
threat which can be avoided only by commission of the offense.""
The element of coercion implicit in the concept of duress as typically
applied is illustrated by State v. St. Clair.e6 Defendant was charged with
participation in an armed robbery. In defense he alleged that his participa-
tion was involuntary, induced by a threat against his life by the other
armed robbers. The reviewing court reversed the trial court due to its
from Frison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L.
REv. 110 (1975); Note, Duress-Defense to Escape, 3 Am. J. Cnnt. L. 331 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in a prison
escape case involving the claimed defense of necessity. United States v. Bailey, 47
U.S.L.W. 3621 (No. 78-990) (U.S. Mar. 19, 1979).
103. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), affd, 394
Mich. 625, 323 N.W.2d 187 (1975).
104. The Texas Penal Code provision relating to duress, § 8.05, provides, in
part: "(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death
or serious bodily injury to himself or another.: TEx. PEAL CODE A*. § 8.05(a)
(Vernon 1974). Note that prior to enactment of this section, the duress defense in
Texas was available only if the threats were directed against the individual defendant.
Jackson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 488, 489-90 (Tx. Crim. App. 1974), construing the
defense raised in light of § 38 of the Penal Code, a statute in effect prior to the
enactment of the new Penal Code, which became effective January 1, 1974.
105. The recognition of duress as a valid defense would seem far wider than that
accorded the defense of necessity. A sampling of cases representative of a number ofjurisdictions would show at least the following history of recognition in American juris-
dictions: Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App. 137, 13 So. 2d 54 (Ct. App. 1943); People
v. Lo Cicero, 80 Cal. Rptr. 913, 459 P.24d 241 (Cal. 1969); Feliciano v. State, 332
A.2d 148 (Del. 1975); Koontz v. State, 204 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Hill
v. State, 135 Ga. App. 766, 219 S.E.2d 18 (1975); Hood v. State, 160 Ind. App. 667,
313 N.E.2d 546 (1974); State v. Clay, 220 Iowa 1191, 264 N.W. 77 (1935); State
v. Ellis, 232 Ore. 70, 374 P.2d 461 (1962); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216.
340 A.2d 440 (1975); State v. Amundson, 69 Wis. 554, 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975).
Duress is recognized as a defense in federal prosecutions. United States v. Mc-
Clain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173 (6th
Cir. 1974) (refusing to charge on duress not error where defendant police officer con-
victed for giving perjured testimony before grand jury).
106. 262 S.,V.2d 25 (Mo. 1953).
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failure to submit an appropriate charge to the jury that reflected the de-
fense raised by the evidence. The court noted that "to constitute a defense
to a criminal charge, the coercion must be present, imminent, and im-
pending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension
of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done."'07 The court
observed that a reasonable opportunity on the part of defendant to avert
the threatened harm would negate the potential use of the defense ' , and
cautioned that a threat of future injury would not be sufficient to meet
the evidentiary standard entitling submission of the appropriate instruction
to the jury.0 9
Commentators have observed that while the coercion/duress defense,
available to St. Clair, is attributable to the oppression by other actors, the
defense of necessity draws its validity from oppression by the forces of
nature."0 Using this analysis, the situation in which a person suffering
starvation steals food is distinguishable from that in which a person steals
money to prevent injury to a family member threatened by a weapon-
bearing robber. This distinction rings less true, however, in prison escape
cases in which the threat is of a dual nature. In this situation the threat
is attributable to oppression by another person but involves forced per-
formance of an unnatural act rather than retaliation for failure to violate
a statute. For this reason, the best approach to distinguish the two defenses
may prove to be reliance on the language used by the legislature in those
states where one or both defenses are recognized by statute.
B. Use of Justification Defenses in Prison Escape Cases
1. Rejection of the Defense. The Missouri court, confronted with
the necessity defense in a prison escape case, relied on both the facts
and the absence of such a defense in Missouri case or statutory law in
affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on necessity. State
v. Green"' involved a defendant who had been threatened with homo-
sexual assault and had previously been assaulted homosexually at the
institution. His prior record of reporting such incidents, the response of
prison officials in transferring him or otherwise offering some measure
of assistance as a result of such reports, and the six-hour lapse of time
between the threats and his escape were cited by the court in concluding
that the defendant could have sought assistance from prison authorities
107. Id. at 27.
108. Id. at 27-28.
109. Id. at 27.
110. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HAND oorK CmiNAL LAW § 50 (1972). Sec
generally authorities cited in People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 772 n.7, 75 Cal. Rptr.
597, 601 n.8 (1969); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 570 n.2 (Mo. 1971).
111. 470 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
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rather than resorting to escape.1"2 Although the court found no case
law supporting the claimed defense, it distinguished the facts from those
in which the defendant might have been immediately threatened and not
had time to report the threat to authorities." 3 Finally, the court held that
defendant in reality sought to raise the defense as an attack on the con-
ditions of his confinement, which, it noted, would not justify his escape 114
Another issue raised by defendant was the lack of legal assistance at the
institution which, he claimed, denied him access to the courts to protect
himself. The court responded by pointing to the large number of actions
filed by inmates pro se and to the availability of legal representation
through contact by way of the mail.115
In dissent, Justice Seiler would have permitted defendant to rely on
his asserted defense at trial."6 He compared the defense with two justifica-
tion defenses approved by the court, coercion/duress and self-defense.
The situation faced by defendant and persuasive to the dissent w'as crys-
tallized in the response of a high prison official who had allegedly told
defendant that he had three options in dealing with the threat of assaults:
submit, defend himself, or escape. Given the fact that defendant had been
threatened by five other inmates, Seiler concluded that escape was his
only viable alternative.17
The dissent further noted the court's prior approval of the self-defense
ground for justification in a case involving forced sodomy.118 In State v.
Robinson,"9 in which defendant had been charged with manslaughter for
killing an attacker who threatened homosexual assault, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that the general authority of citizens to resist or
prevent the commission of felonies with reasonable force was available
as a justification for defendant's resistance of forced sodomy, a felony
under Missouri law. Although the dissent did not draw the conclusion,
it appears obvious that the court would have recognized Green's right
to defend himself, even with deadly force, if the threatened attack had
materialized; however, Green's avoidance of a violent confrontation by
escaping would not be justified on the ground of necessity.
2. Authorization of the Defense. Confronted with facts similar to those
112. Id. at 569.
113. Id. at 568 (citing State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953)).
114. Id. at 568. Similarly, in People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.2d
342 (1972) the court ruled that prisoners who had rioted, protesting general and
specific conditions of the institution and their incarceration, could not raise a defense
of necessity, based upon the New York statute. N.Y. PNAL Lmv § 35.03(2) (McKin-
ney 1975).
115. 470 S.W.2d at 567.
116. Id. at 568 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 570 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 570 (Seiler, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d
627 (Mo. 1959)).
119. 328 S.V.2d 667, 670 (1959).
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presented to the Missouri Supreme Court in Green, the Michigan Court
of Appeals expressed its approval for the use of the duress defense in
prison escape cases in People v. Harmon.2 0 In Harmon the defendant
testified that his escape was the result of the threat of homosexual assault
in a penal institution, that he had twice previously been assaulted by
inmates who threatened him because of this refusal to voluntarily engage
in homosexual activities, and that the escape was the only viable option
he faced due to his perceived fear of reprisals for reporting the threat of
continued assaults.121 His testimony was, in part, corroborated by another
inmate who had interrupted one such assault before it could culminate in
forced sexual attack122 and by a deputy warden who testified concerning
the incidence of homosexual activity in the institution, the threat to the
defendant, and the prospect of reprisals against individuals who report
such threats to prison officials.'2
In contrast to the position taken in Missouri, the Harmon court char-
acterized appellants argument as a justified attack on the conditions of
his confinement. 24 The Harmon court concluded that "[i]f our prison
system fails to live up to its responsibilities in this regard (inmate safety)
we should not, indirectly, countenance such failure by precluding the pre-
sentation of a defense based on those facts."12 While the court expressed
its recognition of such a defense in terms of duress, its discussion of that
defense focused on an allegation that the violation was "necessitated by
threatening conduct of another which resulted in defendant harboring a
reasonable fear of imminent or immediate death or serious bodily harm."120
The court, agreeing with the Missouri court's position in St. Clair,
observed that a threat of future injury was insufficient to establish the
defense.127 The issue of the imminence or immediacy of the threat, how-
ever, is one to be decided by the trier of fact.'2 Thus, it becomes incum-
bent upon the trial court to grant the defendant's requested instruction
once a colorable claim to the defense is asserted and established by any
evidence, and the defendant is entitled to have his jury evaluate the
critical aspects of the claimed threat and his right to respond to it by
escape.
120. 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974).
121. Id. at 214.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 213 (citing Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E. D. Ark. 1969)).
125. 220 N.W.2d at 213.
126. Id. at 214.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court observed: "[t]he issue of whether the alleged dangor was
immediate or imminent is, in all but the clearest cases, to be decided by t trier
of fact taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances, including the defen-
dant's opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm." Id.
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The Harmon court responded to the state's argument that recognition
of a duress defense will encourage escape by noting that the duty to
evaluate the credibility of testimony relating to the escapee's claimed fear
of homosexual assault will remain with the trier of fact.'2 The court
further noted that the availability of the duress defense might have the
salutary effect of generating reform and improvement of prison conditions,
thereby limiting the availability of the defense in a preventative fashion130
In this manner the Harmon court sought to allay fears expressed in People
v. Noble,13' which held that defendant's fear of homosexual attack was
insufficient to negate the culpability requirement inherent in the intent
factor in a prison escape prosecution. The Noble court had speculated on
the abuse of the defense and related incentive for inmate escape should
a defendant be allowed to respond to prosecution with testimony con-
cerning his fear of attack within the confines of the penal institution. 32
The California Court of Appeals dealt with the use of a necessity
defense in a prison escape case in People v. Lovercamp.J1  Although the
court approved of the use of the defense, it laid down strict criteria to
be met by a defendant.134 Defendant Lovercamp and her co-defendant at
trial, Wynashe, sought to offer proof that they had been subjected to
continuing threats of homosexual assault by lesbian inmates, that prison
officials had failed to respond to the threats, and that, on the day of the
escape, a fight between the defendants and the other inmates occurred. "'
The Lovercamp court, in tracing the history of the necessity defense
in escape cases, drew upon a 1736 case which held that when the prisoner
escaped in an effort to save his life after a prison had caught fire, the
necessity to save his life would "excuseth the felony.""10 The court noted,
however, that the defense offered problems if used only as a protest against
generally inferior standards of life within the institution.13 7
Thus, the court was careful to distinguish those situations in which
the defense would be available as a result of some immediate threat of
death or serious bodily injury from those in which the inmate's concern
129. Id.
130. Id. at 215.
131. 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969).
132. Id.
133. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
134. Id. at 832-33, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
135. Id. at 826, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
136. Id. at 826-27, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12 (citing I Hale P.C. 611 (1736)).
137. Id. at 826-27, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12 (citing State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439,
443 (1880) (unsanitary conditions)) Hinkle v. Commonwealth, 23 Ky. L Rptr. 1988,
1989-90, 66 S.W. 816, 817 (1902) (fear of being shot); Johnson v. State, 122 Ca. 172,
50 S.E. 65 (1905) (unmerited punishment at the hands of custodian); State v. Cahill,
196 Iowa 486, 489-90, 194 N.W. 191, 193 (1923) (bread and water, unsanitary condi-
tions); State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 309, 72 A.2d 442, 443 (1950) (bad food, brutality,
inadequate medical treatment).
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was principally directed to general, on-going conditions of confinement 38
Interestingly, the court discussed two cases in which the defense had been
dealt with unfavorably by California courts. In People v. Whipple30 de-
fendant raised the issue of brutal and inhumane treatment at the hands of
prison officials. The court, noting the "absolute necessity" doctrine,140
nevertheless observed that jail escape based on adverse conditions of con-
finement, even so adverse as to seriously imperil health and life, was an
offense committed at the peril of the escapee and that the defense would
not be available.141
The court in People v. Richards42 dealt with an escape alleged to have
been necessitated by fear of death after refusing to participate in homo-
sexual conduct. The court held that the defense required a weighing of
the relative harms or evils involved in the threat to the escaping prisoner
and those involved in escape itself. Accordingly, the court simply found
that the threat to the individual was of lesser harm than the threat of his
escape to society. 143
Thus, the Lovercamp court reached its decision despite precedent
that refused to recognize a defense of necessity based upon adverse
circumstances surrounding confinement in a penal institution. In ruling
that the defendant was, in law, entitled to have her defense presented
to the jury and an appropriate instruction granted, the court accommodated
prior case law to some extent by establishing five criteria that must be
satisfied by a defendant seeking to defend a prosecution for prison escape
on the ground of necessity.14 The court cautioned prisoners and the
public alike that the defense would be "extremely limited in its applica-
tion."14 Essential to its application would be the duty upon the prisoner
to make himself available to authorities at the first opportunity for a return
to custody.146 The court, therefore, offers a sobering note to those who
might interpret its opinion as a general grant of freedom based on un-
favorable prison conditions affecting the escapee and necessitating illegal
departure from the institution.147 The five criteria specifically enumerated
138. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
139. 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
140. Id. at 263, 279 P. at 1009.
141. Id.
142. 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Ct. App. 1969).
143. Id. at 777, 775 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
144. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
145. Id. at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
146. Id.
147. The requirement that the defendant return to custody voluntarily by turn-
ing himself into authorities at the first opportunity following the justifiable escape
has also been held critical in federal prosecutions. The Supreme Court recognized the
right of a prisoner to escape from a burning prison in an effort to save his own life
in Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 226 (1921); however, the element of return to
custody has proved the basis for affirmed convictions in United States v. Chapman,
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by the court were as follows:
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible
sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there
exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from
such complaints illusory;
(3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison
personnel or other "innocent" persons in the escape; and
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities
when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate
threat 148
After applying the enumerated criteria, the court in Lovercamp held
that the defendant had shown herself entitled to recourse to the defense
of necessity in her prosecution for escape.149 The application of the criteria
in strict fashion serves to reconcile Lovercamp with the prior decisions
in Whipple and Richards. Lovercamp requires a specific threat of injury
or death, rather than general adverse conditions of confinement, as the
initial factor that may justify escape. Second, the other criteria tend to
define and provide a standard for weighing the initial harm factor against
the harm that may result from prison escape. In a sense, this harm is
delineated by the parameters of duration of the escape, absence of injury
to personnel or innocent persons, and the failure of the institutional safe-
guards to adequately protect the prisoner.
The strict guidelines of Lovercamp may well be attributable to a
careful balancing of interests on the part of the reviewing court. In the
absence of a statutorily established defense of necessity, the court fashioned
its own rule based on the common law and strictly applied it. Hence, it
cannot be supposed that California has recognized a general defense of
necessity that would be available in other types of prosecution. The guide-
lines with respect to prison escape cases are so tightly drawn that in
any other attempted use of the defense, the reviewing court would likely
be called upon to draft guidelines appropriate to the offense charged.
The Illinois Supreme Court, dealing with the defense of necessity
in a prison escape case, People v. Unger,9 0 applied a less rigid standard
than did the California court in Lovercamp. Significantly, the Illinois
Legislature previously had enacted a provision making the necessity defense
455 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendant asserted that his escape was made under
duress from other escaping inmates), and in United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 587(9th Cir. 1977) (defendants duress defense failed because of his failure to turn himself
in to authorities for over two years after his escape).
148. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16.
149. Id. at 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16.
150. 33 Ill. App. 3d 770,338 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
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available to criminal defendants. 51 The language of the statute does not
limit the defense to certain prosecutions, nor does it establish the type
of limiting criteria essential in the decision reached in Lovercamp.
The Unger court, considering the Lovercamp guidelines, noted that
each presented a relevant factor to be considered in assessing the asserted
defense. 52 However, the court chose to interpret the statute as not requiring
that each condition specified by the California court is, as a matter of law,
a prerequisite in establishing a meritorious defense of necessity. 113 The
defendant in Unger had not made himself available to authorities for his
return to custody, but the court held this was not absolutely determinative
with regard to the availability of the necessity defense in his prosecution. 1"4
Arguably, requiring the defendant to turn himself in is the most op-
pressive of the five requirements established by the Lovercamp court.
If there is sufficient evidence of threat of death or physical harm to the
defendant and no prison official or other innocent person involved is
injured in the escape, then the fact of a history of futile complaints or
lack of concern on the part of authorities places the escapee in a most
difficult position in choosing to turn himself in to the authorities after the
escape. The prisoner is faced with returning to continuing threats and
continuing official inaction as a result of his compliance with the Lover-
camp court's mandate, particularly since the escapee cannot be assured
that he will not simply be returned to the same institution and face the
same situation or conditions of confinement.
Distinguishing its holding from Lovercamp, the Illinois Supreme Court,
by holding that the defendant had established the defense sufficiently to
allow it to go to the jury, in effect ruled that the Lovercamp criteria are
matters that go to the weight and credibility of the defense.155 Furthermore,
the court ruled that an instruction on the defense of necessity must be
given when the defendant offers evidence of the defense and that the
trial court is not to weigh the evidence offered in deciding whether such
an instruction may be justified.Y55 The absence of one of the criteria of
Lovercamp, accordingly, would not be grounds for denial of the instruc-
tion in Illinois trial courts.
151. The provision states that:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of
necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning developing the
situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a
public or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result
From his own conduct.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
152. 338 N.E.2d at 446.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Additionally, the Unger court speculated on the theoretical basis of
defendant's defense, distinguishing the necessity defense from the com-
pulsion defense, both recognized by statute in Illinois.5 7 Compulsion
involves the loss of the individual's free will by the threat of imminent
physical harm. 1 58 The coercion/compulsion defense arises when the de-
fendant is forced to commit an offense as a result of a direct personal
threat against the individual if he fails or refuses to engage in the offense.
Necessity, on the other hand, involves a choice made by an individual
confronted with two admitted evils. Thus, Unger was forced to choose
between homosexual assault and reprisal for seedng protection or escape.
The majority found this distinguishable from the situation in which an
inmate is threatened with death or physical harm unless he participates
in an escape from the institution. In the latter instance, the defense of
compulsion would be applicable.159
C. Future Application of the Necessity Defense
The continuum from Green to Lovercamp to Harmon and Unger rep-
resents a rather interesting range of reaction to the situation facing inmates
threatened with homosexual assault. Clearly, as evidenced by the Missouri
and California decisions, some courts will rely on a strict reading of the
facts to deny availability of the defense if, in fact, the court is willing
to recognize its validity at all. In Green, the Missouri Supreme Court
distinguished between the facts before it and a situation in which the
threat was far more immediate and directed toward the inmate's com-
mission of an illegal act without recourse to intervention by prison of-
ficials,160 even though it ruled that it could find no recognition of a defense
of necessity in Missouri law.l6e A less easily distinguishable fact situation
might have forced a more charitable decision from the majority.
Contrary to the strict application of law to fact evidenced in Green
and Lovercamp, the Harmon and Unger courts both proved more benev-
olent by affording the defendant an opportunity to put his theory of
defense before the jury. Moreover, the Harmon court showed no timidity
in discussing the underlying sociological problems relating to prison con-
ditions and the perceived need for penal reform.1 2  The existence of a
157. 338 N.E.2d at 444 (citing IL. REv. ST.AT. ch. 38, §§ 7-11, 7-13 (1973)).
158. 338 N.E.2d at 444.
159. Id.
160. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d at 568.
161. Id. at 567-68.
162. The Harmon court concluded: "While it is obvious that penal reform by
the Legislature is the best solution to this difficult problem [homosexual assault within
prison], we should not, because of that fact, preclude a defendant from presenting
available defenses in the courts of this state." 220 N.W.2d at 215.
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statutory defense, as in Illinois,'63 should also ease the burden of the
court in considering the equity of arguments presented in behalf of the
necessity defense. At least two appellate courts have expressed approval of
the necessity defense in prison escape cases, each declining to hold it
applicable to the evidence offered and issues raised in the case before it.'"
The Texas statute6" would seem to afford defendants in prison escape
cases a similar basis for defense, since no apparent statutory limitation on
its use in such prosecutions exists.
The prison escape cases present a difficult problem in the develop-
ment of common law concerning the defense of necessity. First, the offense
is one of particular sensitivity because it involves, by definition, defendants
who have formerly been adjudged guilty of criminal conduct warranting
incarceration. No defense is available for these defendants in the absence
of an attack on the conditions of their confinement through the assertion
of some duress or necessity justifying or excusing their escape. Legitimate
societal concerns regarding the safety of the community mandate that
individuals be successfully restrained during the period of their sentences.
Hence, a community that is fearful of escape may prove less than sym-
pathetic to the defense asserted in a prosecution growing out of that escape.
The recognition of these legitimate societal concerns on the part of
the judiciary may be responsible for the fashioning of strict rules before
accepting even a limited defense of necessity. Unfortunately, this judicial
'legislation" may influence prosecutions not involving prison escape,
resulting in rules limiting the availability of the defense when society's
interest in doing so is less immediate.
Second, the language of the cases surveyed betrays a distrust of the
jury on the part of some reviewing courts. By establishing rigid standards
to be met by the defendant before he may be entitled to present his
theory of defense to the jury, courts may tend to restrict judicially the
availability of the defense even when statutory enactment or common law
principles would not do so.
Third, the prison escape cases are, in effect, grounded in an attack
on the conditions of confinement that might often be more appropriately
litigated in another context and forum. This has undoubtedly led to restric-
tion on the availability of the defense in escape cases. The question posed,
however, is whether judicial skepticism resulting from this reality should
extend to other types of cases. In a number of cases a defendant might
163. ILL. A N. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
164. Helton v. State, 311 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v.
Boleyn, 325 So. 2d 95, 97 (La. 1976). The Florida and Louisiana courts, noting the
availability of the defense in appropriate cases, did not have the benefit, or constriction,
of prior legislation recognizing the necessity or necessity-theory duress defense.
The Hawaii Supreme Court authorized use of the necessity defense based upon
statute in prison escape cases in State v. Horn, 58 Hawaii 252, 566 P.2d 1378 (1977).
165. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974).
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attempt to use the necessity defense to litigate issues which should properly
be raised in the legislature or in civil actions.C" It is not unreasonable to
assume that courts, particularly trial courts, may seek some limitation of
the defense in this context to keep the issues before the court consistent
with the usual kinds of matters involved in criminal prosecutions.
V. CONCLUSION
The defense of necessity as adopted by the Texas Legislature could
prove useful to the criminal defendant in a number of situations. Particularly
in those cases when an otherwise "innocent" act, in terms of criminal
intent, may still be sufficiently severe to subject the actor to prosecution,
the necessity defense may be viewed as a general ground for jury nullifica-
tion- The response of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, as evidenced
by prior case law, may prove unfavorable to this use of the defense, pred-
icated largely on the potential for abuse inherent in any general nulli-
fication-type defense. 67
Based on the broad applicability of the language of section 9.22,"c'
the defense will likely be raised in a number of contexts less serious than
those involving prison escape or welfare fraud. For instance, the recognition
of medically valuable uses of marihuana by a District of Columbia trial
court 169 may signal an attack on offenses related to marihuana based on
medical necessity for possession and use. Medical evidence indicates that
marihuana is valuable in treatment of glaucoma, asthma, and epilepsy as
well as an analgesic for cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy.170 A
166. In a prosecution for welfare fraud, for example, a defendant might raise
the issues of earnings limits and benefit restrictions to prove the necessity of the fraud.
Litigation aimed at reform of aspects of the welfare system has been both significant and
widespread in recent years. Examples include: Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974)
(striking down a statutory scheme of flat grant maximum allowances for work-related
expense deductions required by 42 U.S.C. § 602a(7) to be credited against worling
earnings of working welfare recipients in computation of benefit eligibility); Maryland
v. Mathews, 415 F.Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1976) (governmental units participating in the
welfare system challenged HEW regulations authorizing cutoff of federal monies in
response to ineffective state control of over-payments).
167. Indeed, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals seems already to have ap-
preached the defense with caution. Refer to notes 70-75 supra and accompanying text.
168. TEx. PENAr. CODE ANN. 4 9.22 (Vernon 1974).
169. United States v. Randall, [1975-76] 20 Carm. L. REP. (BNA) 2.99 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Nov. 24, 1976) (use in treatment of glaucoma). The trial court found
substantial evidence to support defendants claim that marihuana had a medically
accepted use in treating glaucoma. The defendant had shown a progressive deteriora-
tion in his eyesight and offered testimony that all ether drugs used in conventional
treatment of the disease had proven ineffective in curbing the continuing loss of vision
and offered expert testimony that surgery entailed a serious risk of immediate blind-
ness. The court ruled that the defendant had supplied sufficient evidence to raise
the defense of necessity, that it constituted an affirmative defense on which he would
be charged with carrying the burden of proof, and that the grounds for criminalization
of marihuana appeared to be less than well-founded, based on empirical data now
available.
170. See Drug Treaty Obligation Doesn't Free DEA from Consulting HEW on
Schedules, [1977] 21 Cimi. L. REP. (BNA) 2114, 2116.
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defendant not having a factual defense might be able to offer evidence of
a medical need for marihuana to justify an instruction on necessity.
The Texas statute is sufficiently broad to allow wide use of the neces-
sity defense unless restrictions, such as those imposed in Roy and Lover-
camp, are imposed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Whereas the
prison escape cases all involve actors faced with a threat of death or serious
bodily injury, the language of the Texas statute, which is grounded in the
word "harm," would appear to apply even where the threatened injury
is less serious. The term "harm" is defined in the Texas Penal Code as
"anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including
harm to another person in whom the person affected is interested."'
This definition clearly exceeds the concept of threat of death or serious
bodily injury. The element of harm extending to other persons in whom
the affected person may be interested should, in fact, make the defense
available in all cases, including welfare fraud, in which the intent of the
actor arises from parental duty or a moral obligation felt by a family
member or close friend.
The necessity defense is one step toward returning the system of
criminal justice to the community. 172 The rigidity with which courts will
apply or deny access to the defense will reflect the confidence of the
appellate judiciary in the jury system.173 The Texas statute should afford a
defendant an opportunity to have a jury weigh the factors involved in
a decision to commit a criminal offense.
In this respect, the Texas statute' 74 is far more favorable than the
Colorado7 5 and New York statutes" that require the judge to rule on the
sufficiency of the defendant's evidence of necessity before permitting the
171. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(16) (Vernon 1974).
172. Schleflin, Jury Nullification: the Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168,
223-26 (1972).
173. Chief judge Bazelon supplies a perceptive rejoinder to the argument that
the defense of necessity should not be allowed in cases in which the defendant's
act stems from political or moral opposition to the statute violated. He notes:
If revulsion against the war ... has reached a point where a jury would be
unwilling to convict a defendant for commission of the acts alleged here, wo
would be far better advised to ponder the implications of that result than to
spend our time devising strategems which let us pretend that the power of
nullification does not even exist.
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974).
175. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-1-702 (1973). The Colorado statute has been raised
by a prisoner who was charged with possession of a knife during a search of his prison
cell. People v. Robertson, 543 P.2d 533 (Coo. Ct. App. 1975). The court hold that
the defense was unavailable to the defendant because he failed to allege a specific
and imminent threat of physical injury to his person, leaving him no alternative to
violation of the law. The defendant had argued that his failure to turn the knife in to
the prison authorities which he alleged had been "planted" in his cell, was duo to
his fear of retaliation Aom other inmates. Id. at 534.
176. N.Y. PENAL Lw § 35.05 (McKinney 1967).
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defense to be submitted to the jury. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
however, as evidenced by its decision in Roy, may permit trial courts to
control use of the defense, rather than relying on the liberal approach of
the Woods decision that granted defendants the right to have this theory
presented to the jury. The direction to be taken by the court will bear
directly on the value of the defense to prospective defendants and, con-
comitantly, on the quality of the jury trial right available to criminal
defendants.
Furthermore, by failing to provide a restriction common to several of
the necessity defense statutes that makes the defense unavailable if the
defendant seeks to raise a defense predicated on moral conscience or the
desirability of the statute, the Texas statute at least opens the door for
use of the defense in such a context. The defendant should not be reticent
to allow his peers to sit in judgment on his moral or political ideals and
weigh them in light of community standards. Traditionally, the law has
rested upon the consensus of the community that criminal actions warrant
punishment.1'- In the event community standards, as reflected in the
decisions of its juries, no longer support the underlying rationale of the
criminal law regarding a particular statute, we should not opt for enforce-
ment of the law despite community sentiment.78
The ultimate danger is exemplified by the Wootton case. The criminal
law exists to protect individuals from those wvho would violate their per-
sonal and property rights, and the willingness of the community to excuse
conduct directed at a racial, ethnic, or political minority is a real concern.
The line is difficult to draw, but it seems highly questionable to draw it in
opposition to faith in the jury system if we are to maintain the traditions
of the constitutional guarantee to the right to jury trial.
The fact that the legislature has opened the line of communication
between the defendant and the jury should influence both trial courts
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to recognize the right of the
defendant to his requested instruction on necessity when the issue is raised
by any evidence. The community dictates, in theory, the need and applica-
tion of the criminal law and those standards of conduct with which we
are to comply.179 The judiciary should never be too frightened, especially
177. The United States Supreme Court relied directly on this principle in Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), establishing community standards in the locale in
which the prosecution is brought in a determination as to whether material is to be
considered obscene for purposes of prosecution, or permissible within the bounds of
the first amendment.
178. The irony inherent in this question is apparent in Judge Bazelon's opinion
in Dougherty. United States v. Dougherty, 743 F.2d 1113, 1139-44 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Refer to note 173 supra.
179. Tx. PIrAL CODE A u. § 1.02 (Vernon 1974). This section states: "The
general purposes of this code are to establish a system of prohibitions, penalties, and
correctional measures to deal with conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes
or threatens harm to those individual or public interests for which state protection is
appropriate... :'Id.
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an elected judiciary as in Texas,'80 to permit the jury' to review those
standards in light of the facts of an individual criminal prosecution.
180. TEx. CoNsT. art. V, §§ 4, 7, 15, 18. These sections govern, respectively, elec-
tion of judges to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, county courts,
and as justices of the peace.
181. TEx. CONS?. art. I, § 10 provides the constitutional guarantee of trial byjury in Texas.
